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Abstract
The awareness and sense of privacy has increased in the minds of people over the past few years.
Earlier, people were not very restrictive in sharing their personal information, but now they
are more cautious in sharing it with strangers, either in person or online. With such privacy
expectations and attitude of people, it is difficult to embrace the fact that a lot of information is
publicly available on the web. Information portals in the form of the e-governance websites run
by Delhi Government in India provide access to such PII without any anonymization. Several
databases e.g., Voterrolls, Driving Licence number, MTNL phone directory, PAN card serve as
repositories of personal information of Delhi residents. This large amount of available personal
information can be exploited due to the absence of proper written law on privacy in India. PII
can also be collected from various social networking sites like Facebook, Twitter, GooglePlus etc.
where the users share some information about them. Since users themselves put this information,
it may not be considered as a privacy breach, but if the information is aggregated, it may give out
much more information resulting in a bigger threat. For e.g., data from social networks and open
government databases can be combined together to connect an online identity to a real world
identity. Even though the awareness about privacy has increased, the threats possible due to the
availability of this large amount of personal data is still unknown. To bring such issues to public
notice, we developed Open-source Collation of eGovernment data And Networks (OCEAN), 1
a system where the user enters little information (e.g. Name) about a person and gets large
amount of personal information about him / her like name, age, address, date of birth, mother’s
name, father’s name, voter ID, driving licence number, PAN. On aggregation of information
within the Voter ID database, OCEAN 2 creates a family tree of the user giving out the details
of his / her family members as well. We also calculated a privacy score, which calculates the
risk associated with that individual in terms of how much PII of that person is revealed from
open government data sources. 1,693 users had the highest privacy score making them the most
vulnerable to risks. Using OCEAN, 3 we could collect 8,195,053 Voterrolls; 2,24,982 Driving
licence; 53,419 PAN card numbers; 1,557,715 Twitter; 3,377,102 Facebook; 29,393 Foursquare;
1,86,798 LinkedIn and 28,900 GooglePlus records. There exist several websites like Yasni, 4
PeekYou, 5 Pipl 6 which help in searching a person on the Internet but are not focused for
people living in Delhi. We performed a user evaluation of OCEAN 7 in a survey study to
evaluate the usability, effectiveness and impact of OCEAN 8 and showed that users like and
find it convenient to use it in real-world. We received 661 total hits (657 unique visitors) from
the day we released the system, January 21, 2013, until October 10, 2013. To the best of our
knowledge, this is the first real world deployed tool which provides personal information about
residents of Delhi to everyone free of cost.
1http://precog.iiitd.edu.in/research/ocean.
2OCEAN: Best poster award, IIT Kanpur Symposium on Cyber Security, 2013
3OCEAN: Work covered in national newspaper of Delhi, Hindustan in April 2013
4http://www.yasni.com/.
5http://www.peekyou.com/india.
6https://pipl.com/.
7OCEAN: Work highlighted on IIIT - Delhi website, Research section
8OCEAN: Accepted poster at IBM I-care, 2012
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Chapter 1
Research Motivation and Aim
The Government of India is encouraging all states of the union of India to move to e-governance
model and distribute information digitally through websites. 1 In it’s tenth five year plan, it
announced that it should make government processes to be a ‘SMART’(Simple, Moral, Account-
able, Responsible and Transparent) governance. This had led to several e-governance initiatives
by many states and resulted in publicly accessible databases. A lot of states in India are storing
information about its people digitally i.e., in the form of databases. These data repositories are
created in order to improve data availability, make application processes easier, making data
available for quicker responses to RTI requests etc. As a case study, we have focussed on the
databases maintained by Delhi government only. Government of Delhi has implemented most of
the aforementioned e-governance guidelines and created databases for critical IDs like Driving
Licence, Voter ID, PAN card, MTNL, Income tax e-filing where the user can query the system
and obtain his / her data. All the above databases though are designed to speed up the ex-
change of information done among various government departments and for easy dispersal of
information to the general population, they pose a threat to the privacy of any individual whose
data can be obtained by querying the data-stores through their public interfaces. Also, often
data obtained from one such source can be used as the input to another source and extract more
data. The potential exploitation of individual’s privacy is a major concern. A threat model
describing threats, security issues and vulnerabilities from these government portals is described
in the Section 3.
The privacy perceptions of Indian citizens have changed in the recent years [1]. They demand for
protection of the data they share digitally. A recent report identifies a number of examples that
may be considered PII [2] including: Name (full name, maiden name, mothers maiden name),
personal identication number (e.g., Social Security Number), address (street or email address),
telephone numbers, or personal characteristics (such as photographic images especially of face or
other distinguishing characteristic, X-rays, fingerprints, or other biometrics). The Information
Technology Act 2000 of Indian Parliament, 2 considers any information that directly / indirectly
identifies a person as personal information. The offline world of a user, which is characterized
by personal attributes like name, address, Date of Birth (DOB), age, father’s name / mother’s
name can be considered as PII since it helps in uniquely identifying a person. This personal
information is stored digitally by the Delhi government in the form of several databases like
Voter ID, Driving Licence, MTNL phone directory, PAN card number. Figure 1.1 shows the
public interface of PAN card database of Income Tax department of Delhi. Even though dif-
ferent government departments maintain individual databases, the data can be aggregated and
1http://planningcommission.nic.in/plans/planrel/fiveyr/10th/volume2/10th vol2.pdf
2http://deity.gov.in/sites/upload files/dit/files/GSR313E 10511.pdf
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Figure 1.1: Public interface of PAN card database of Income Tax department of Delhi. The input is first
name, last name and DOB of the person and the output is full name and PAN number.
misused, if needed. However, PII is sensitive, appropriate precautions are required to protect
PII, as the unauthorized release or abuse of PII could result in potentially grave repercussions
for the individual whos PII has been compromised. For example, the information can be used
to create fake documents, open fake bank accounts, procure phone connection or credit card by
pretending to be someone else. PAN card can be used to link a person’s credit card, banking,
income tax returns, house and other cash or immovable assets data.
The online world characterized by attributes like name, location, profile images, profile url etc.
is shared by the user on various social networking sites like Facebook, Twitter, GooglePlus etc.
The profile image which is publicly available on these sites can be morphed and can be used with
bad intentions. Since users themselves share this information, it cannot be said as a privacy
loss, but if all these data can be combined together, it will give out much more information
than desired by the users. Several cases 3 exist to show the rise of identity thefts using the per-
sonal information obtained from these social networks. For e.g., the malicious users can access
accounts of individuals on various social networking sites such as Facebook, Twitter etc. and
retrieve their photos and other information and use the same for making fake driving licences,
applying for telephone connections, opening bank accounts and making PAN cards and credit
cards.
1.1 Vulnerabilities in Open Government Data
The various countries in the world, including US, 4 UK 5 and India 6 have started open gov-
ernment initiatives to make some information accessible to people. In this thesis work, we have
focussed on the publicly available datasets from government of India and discuss the vulner-
abilities existing from these sources in this section. The information obtained from one open
3http://www.hindustantimes.com/India-news/Gurgaon/Identity-theft-cases-on-the-rise/Article1-931638.aspx
4http://www.archives.gov/open/available-datasets.html
5http://data.gov.uk/data/search
6http://data.gov.in/
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government source can be used as an input to other open government source and can be used
to extract highly sensitive information. The findings are discussed below.
1.1.1 Income Tax Returns
An open government initiative by Income Tax Department, Government of India, allows individ-
uals to pay their tax online. 7 The registration page needs details like PAN number, fullname,
DOB, email-ID and phone number. The first three set of information is available from the Voter
ID and PAN card databases of the Government of Delhi. The last two can be entered as dummy
/ fake values. Once the user is registered, he / she is asked to fill a registration form specifying
the address and setting a password for himself / herself. The activation link sent to the fake
e-mail account verifies and registers the user on the portal. Once the user gets registered, we
can view the Form 26AS which shows the tax statement (tax credit) of the individual. The
form shows the total amount of tax paid by the individual in the chosen financial year (for e.g.,
2013-2014 in this case). Figure 1.2 shows the tax statement of a random person as shown in
this article. 8 (Note: The image is taken from the article. 9)
Figure 1.2: Screenshot showing the tax statement of a random person on Income tax e-filing portal.
1.1.2 Online Voter ID card
Today, Voter ID card is a must in India. Every law abiding citizen is bound to have this identity
card. The Government of India has set up a portal / service which allows people to get a Voter
ID card online. The ease with which multiple fake Voter ID cards can be generated is of great
concern. The registration page for the portal 10 requires a mobile number and an e-mail account
(which can be faked as described in the previous section). After the registration, the user is asked
to fill a form entering his / her name, gender, town / district. All this information is available
from the Voter ID database of the Government of Delhi and can be used directly. Thereafter,
the user is required to fill another form giving a detailed set of personal information like name,
7https://incometaxindiaefiling.gov.in/
8http://www.techtree.com/content/features/4227/guide-how-file-income-tax-returns-online-2013-edition.html
9http://www.techtree.com/content/features/4227/guide-how-file-income-tax-returns-online-2013-edition.html
10http://eci-citizenservices.nic.in/
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DOB, age, address, gender, family details as shown in the Figure 1.3. The above-mentioned
information is available in the Voter ID database of the Delhi government. On completion of
this form, an application ID will be issued to the user which can be used by him / her to trace
the status of the online voter card. The ease of getting into such open government systems with
all the personal information beforehand indicates the alarming situation and a pertaining need
to take immediate actions to help resolve these issues.
Figure 1.3: Screenshot showing the application form of a random user picked from OCEAN database on
online Voter ID portal.
Other open government initiatives like BSES Electricity Bill Payment portal 11 can be exploited
which takes CA number as the input and name, address, load value, circle, district, current
demand details as the output. The incremental nature of the 9-digit CA number makes it
vulnerable to attacks. The examples demonstrate the privacy breach of the citizens in Delhi in
revealing their personal information on the web by various open government initiatives.
1.2 Research Aim
To educate people on the privacy issues and risks arising from open government data, we made
a first attempt to deploy an integrated system, OCEAN: Open-source Collation of eGovernment
data And Networks, where the user can enter little amount of information (e.g. name) about
a person and get large amount of information about him / her: Voter ID, name, address,
age, DOB, father‘s name / mother‘s name, driving licence number, PAN card number and
account information on social networking sites viz., Twitter, Facebook, Foursquare, LinkedIn,
GooglePlus.
OCEAN also aims to demonstrate that aggregation of the available information yields out much
more information about Delhi residents. It creates a family tree for a random user by aggregating
the results within the Voter ID database which helps in finding the details of other family
members. So, the aim of OCEAN is
11http://www.bsesdelhi.com/bsesdelhi/caVerification4Pay.do
5
• To develop a technology to demonstrate the public availability of large amount of personal
information on the web by open government data sources.
• To highlight the privacy issues arising out on the aggregation of this personal information
on Delhi citizens.
• To develop an empirical understanding on awareness, experience and expectations of Delhi
citizens in using the open government data sources.
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Chapter 2
Related Work and Research
Contributions
2.1 Related Work
Personally Identifiable Information (PII) is one of the most central concepts in information
privacy regulation [3]. The scope of privacy laws typically turns on when PII is involved. At the
same time, there is no uniform definition of PII in the data protection law in India. Moreover,
computer science has shown that in many circumstances non-PII can be linked to individuals,
and that de-identified data can be re-identified. This section gives an overview of the related
research showing the privacy risks and attack on the information available from open government
data and social networks.
2.1.1 Privacy on the web / Open Government Data
Digital identities and profiles are precious assets. On one hand they enable users to engage in
transactions and interactions on the Internet. On the other hand, abuses and leakages of this
information can violate the privacy of their owners, sometimes with serious consequences [4]. A
recent article 1 shows that the IT-accounts of famous celebrities in India could be accessed by a
common man. The details were fetched from the e-filing Income tax portal run by government
of Delhi by exploiting the vulnerabilities in the system. Several articles 2 3 demonstrate the
cases of identity thefts where people impersonate an individual with access to his / her personal
information in addition to some fake information. Celnet report [14] shows that E-transactions
account for 30% of the total transactions and 75% of the total payment value is now made
electronically. With the penetration of e-governance and banking applications, the security
of the information of the consumers involved in the transactions is important. Confidential
information (including personal data, financial details, business data) needs to be disclosed in
order to enable these interactions. The information might disclose personal data to third parties
(such as suppliers, information providers, government and financial institutions, etc.) which
lead to privacy loss for the individual. It has been observed that user identity may be exploited
1http://moneylife.in/article/sachin-dhoni-shah-rukh-and-salmans-i-t-accounts-too-hacked-by-ca-
student/34620.html
2http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2012-05-25/nagpur/31850566 1 college-website-engineering-
college-college-authorities
3http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2012-08-27/noida/33424309 1 dubai-identity-theft-residential-
visa
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in attacks on the privacy of users in web search query logs [5]. It presents a new attack in which
a real-world acquaintance of a user attempts to identify that user in a large query log, using
personal information. There have been several articles discussing the potential privacy loss due to
Open Government data. The article 4 shows that preventing disclosure of personal information,
as obtained from open data remains a question. Another article, 5 talks about ‘Mosaic Effect’,
which occurs when the information in an individual dataset, in isolation, may not pose a risk
of identifying an individual (or threatening some other important interest such as security),
but when combined with other available information, could pose a privacy risk. [6] shows the
risks that private information may somehow be collected and published online, and that in
case databases of different agencies where combined, the resulting combination of information
might negatively impact them. The availability of personal information in government records
is exploited for commercial and sometimes criminal purposes. Barber et al. [7] shows that
commercial data aggregators routinely mine government records to gather information about
individuals in the United States.
2.1.2 Privacy in Online Social Networks
India has experienced enormous development in information technology [14]. Over the last
decade, Online Social Media has evolved which is used for maintaining social connections,
thereby introducing online social networks. According to Nielsen’s Social Media Report, users
continue to spend more time on social networks than on any other kind of websites on the In-
ternet [16]. These social networks describe the connections between a user and his / her friends.
With the advent of social networks, the Internet community has experienced a revolution in
its communication habits. These networks allow people to publish details about themselves.
Some information in these networks is private and with some attacks / learning algorithms,
undisclosed information might be revealed. For example, Krishnamurthy et.al [8] showed that
indirect leakage of PII via OSN identiers to third-party aggregation servers is happening on
these networks. Researchers have shown that BBM pins 6 could be extracted from the tweets /
posts of users from Twitter and Facebook respectively which could be used in spamming these
users. The content generated by people in the social network graph of the person can be used
to identify some information about him / her. Zheleva et.al [10] showed that an adversary /
malicious user can exploit an online social network with a mixture of public and private user
proles to predict the private attributes of users. There has been research done to show that the
information about an individual can be inferred from his / her friends in the social network.
Jurgens et al. [9] showed that location of the individual could be inferred using the geographic
distribution of his friends on Twitter. On the other hand, content generated by one person can
be used to gain some information about his / her friends online. Mislove et al. [11] showed that
given a set of attributes for some section of people, it was possible to infer the attributes of
other users connected in the network. Since large amount of data is flowing across the social
networks in digital form, it is impertinent to keep the data secure so that it cannot be used for
unlawful activities.
As described in this section, OCEAN shows that information aggregation gives us more in-
formation; aggregation within open government databases allowed us to create a family tree and
combining some profiles from Facebook, Twitter and Foursquare gave us additional information,
like location, which is available on Twitter but not on Facebook.
4http://www.theguardian.com/society/2012/jul/10/open-data-force-for-good-risks
5http://manypossibilities.net/2013/06/the-open-data-cart-and-twin-horses-of-accountability-and-innovation/
6http://precog.iiitd.edu.in/labs/bbmpinleak/
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2.1.3 Systems built with Open Government Data
Since lot of datasets and reports are published by the government, a lot of work is being done
using this open data. Researchers are working on developing a web portal which will enable
users to explore and analyze the open data available in India [17]. There have been several
systems / portals developed from the open government data sources as reported in the study by
Wright et al. [13].
• IndianKanoon 7: It is a legal search engine which indexes judgements and statutes of
the Supreme Court of India and several High Courts. It also integrates reports of the Law
Commission, open access law journals and other online legal repositories.
• OpenCivic.in 8: The government websites including state assembly elections and profiles
of MP’s in Maharashtra were scraped to get an idea about civic participation. It then
provides an API which provides data in machine readable from which helps developers to
create visualizations.
There have been several applications developed from the open government data in USA 9 and
UK.10
• ABQ Ride 11: The application shows the real-time locations of city buses, within a
minute’s accuracy in the USA. It can also find bus schedules and fares for other public
transportation.
• Illustreets 12: This application puts deprivation, crime, education, transport, environ-
ment, and census data on an interactive, searchable map, which helps in comparing between
locations on the fly. This application is developed for England, UK.
2.2 Research Contributions
• To the best of our knowledge, this is the first deployed system which shows the aggregated
personal information about the residents of Delhi. Few identity search systems, e.g. Yasni,
Pipl and PeekYou which uses multiple approaches to search for a user on the Internet
including social networks are built to extract maximum possible information from the web
about a person, however the result set returned for each user query are large, making
the system non-usable. We conducted a survey study to calculate the standard System
Usability Score (SUS) to measure the effectiveness, efficiency and satisfaction of the users
in using OCEAN.
• Privacy Score: This score tells the risk associated with the person on the leakage of
personally identifiable information about him / her from the open government databases.
• We did a threat modelling on the various open government databases and calculated a
DREAD (Damage, Reproducibility, Exploitability, Affected users, Discoverability) score
7http://www.indiankanoon.org/
8http://www.opencivic.in/
9http://www.data.gov/developer-apps-showcase
10http://data.gov.uk/apps
11http://www.cabq.gov/abq-apps/city-apps-listing/abq-ride
12http://data.gov.uk/apps/illustreets
9
13 to estimate the risks and threats arising due to the availability of personal information
from these sources.
• We developed an empirical understanding of privacy perceptions, awareness of the people
about the open government data and the expectations of the users from the government
in using these data sources.
13http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/DREAD: Risk assessment model
10
Chapter 3
Proposed Methodology
In this section, we discuss the methodology approach used to develop the system. The system
was developed in four phases:
3.1 Identification of Available Online Open Government Sources
The first phase involved identifying all the databases that hold public information readily avail-
able on the Internet. Several databases of Government of Delhi which were looked at are:
• Driving Licence database of the Government of Delhi 1: The driving licence in
India are issued by individual states which permits a person to drive in the country. One
must be 18 years or above to receive this license. The input required was a valid driving
licence number of the form DL-XXYYYYAAAAAAA where DL denoted the state of Delhi,
XX a Location in Delhi, YYYY the year of issue of the license, AAAAAAA unique for
the subject in question. Hence, using a random generated driving licence number we
were able to find various details for a single user like name, address, fathers /mother’s
/ husband’s name, date of birth, validity period, and vehicle category. Repeating the
process for different randomly generated licence numbers we were able to find details of
many subjects. The driving licence database does not have any security features to limit
the number of queries that we could ask the database.
• Voter ID database of Election Commissioner of Delhi 2: Voter ID is a unique
identity given to a user which allows him / her to vote or receive a ballot for an election.
One must be 18 years or above to receive this privilege. This database requires the name
of the subject along with the constituency in which the subject resides. According to the
chief electoral website of Government of Delhi, the state is divided into 70 constituencies.3.
To find the constituency of a particular user, PHP functions were used to extract the
constituency name from the complete address using simple string compare functions. The
data that can be extracted from this database is name, fathers name, date of birth, gender,
ID card number of the card holder. This database also did not have any security feature
to prevent us from querying it multiple times.
• PAN card database of Income Tax department of Delhi 4: PAN number is a
1https://www.dimtspay.in/dldetail/default.aspx
2http://ceodelhi.gov.in/OnlineErms/ElectorSearch.aspx
3http://www.ceodelhi.gov.in/AccemblyConstituenty.aspx.
4https://tin.tin.nsdl.com/tan/servlet/PanStatusTrack
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unique alphanumeric combination issued to all juristic entities identifiable under the Indian
Income Tax Act 1961. This number is mandatory for making financial transactions. One
need to be 18 years or above to get this number. This database requires the name of the
person and DOB as the input. These details could be obtained from the Driving Licence
database mentioned above. The data that can be extracted from this database is name,
PAN number of the card holder. This database too did not have any security feature to
prevent us from querying it multiple times.
• Phone number database of MTNL department of Delhi 5: This database requires
only the name of the person as the input. The data that can be extracted from this
database is name, address and phone number. Since the owning authorities changed the
policy recently, this database is not available for public on OCEAN.
For obtaining the online attributes related to an individual, we collected data from the 5 pop-
ular social networks viz., Twitter, Facebook, Foursquare, LinkedIn, and Google Plus using the
APIs provided by these networks. Table 3.1 shows the information obtained from various open
government data sources and social networks.
Table 3.1: Information extracted from various open government data sources.
Database Input Data Data Retrieved
Driving Licence Driving Licence number Name, Address, Father’s name, DOB, Validity pe-
riod, license type / vehicle category.
Voter ID Name, constituency Voter ID, Name, Address, Father’s / Mother’s / Hus-
band’s name, Age, Gender.
PAN Number Name, DOB PAN Number, Name.
Phone number Name Name, Address, Phone number.
Facebook Name, access token Full name, Facebook ID, Gender, Username, Profile
Image, Profile URL.
Twitter Name, oauth token Full name, Twitter ID, Screen name, Friends count,
Location, Following count, Followers count, Profile
image, Profile URL.
Foursquare Name, oauth token Foursquare ID, Full name, gender, City, Facebook
/ Twitter contact, Friend count, Biography, Badge
count, Mayorship count, Check-in count, Following
count, Profile image, Profile URL.
LinkedIn Name, oauth token LinkedIn ID, Full name, Location, Headline, Profile
image, Profile URL.
Google Plus Name, key GooglePlus ID, Full name, Gender, Tag line, About
me, relationship status, Location, Places Lived, Or-
ganization, Birthday, E-mail, Language, Profile im-
age, profile URL .
5http://phonebook.bol.net.in/
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3.2 Threat Modelling
After identifying the open government data sources, we did a threat modelling to identify the
risks and threats arising from these repositories. A threat model 6 is used to identify holes in
any software application / system which can be exploited from an adversarial point of view. In
this section, we will describe the threat model for the open government databases of government
of Delhi. The various public interfaces owned by the Delhi government are at risk since they do
not contain well defined privacy policies. The ease with which the information is accessible adds
on to the risk level possessed by these open government sources. For e.g., Figure 3.1 shows the
website for Voter ID database of Election Commissioner of Delhi which shows the privacy breach
/ information disclosure by these websites. Entering only an alphabet ‘a’ gives the details of all
the individuals whose name starts from ‘a’. Such an attack can be replicated by a malicious user
very easily. For classifying the security threats of these open government databases, we used
Figure 3.1: Screenshot of Voter ID database showcasing information disclosure. The input for name is
given as ‘a’ and output gives name of all the people having names starting with ‘a’.
Microsoft’s DREAD Risk Assessment Model. 7 This model assigns values to different factors
influencing threats. The various factors which are used to rank a threat are:
1. Damage: How big the damage would be if the attack succeeded?
2. Reproducibility: How easy it is to reproduce the attack to work?
3. Exploitability: How much time, effort, and expertise is needed to exploit the threat?
4. Affected Users: If a threat were exploited, what percentage of users would be affected?
5. Discoverability: How easy is it for an attacker to discover this threat?
A simple scheme such as High (3), Medium (2), and Low (1) is used to rate the system to
calculate the risk value associated with it. Referring to the information portals maintained by
the government of Delhi, it is possible to assign values to the DREAD factors as:
Threat: Malicious user can identify PII of Delhi residents.
• Damage Potential: Threat to reputation of a person and legal liability because of leaking
sensitive information: 2
6http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Threat model
7http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ff648644.aspx
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• Reproducibility: Fully reproducible: 3
• Exploitability: A skilled programmer can launch the attack and repeat the steps: 2
• Affected Users: All users, default configuration: 3
• Discoverability: Published information explains the attack: 3
The overall rating is 2 + 3 + 2 + 3 + 3 = 13 which is considered high. We can thus conclude that
this threat pose a significant risk to the various information portal websites of Delhi government
and needs to be addressed as soon as possible.
Data Flow Diagrams (DFD) can be used to graphically represent a system. Trust boundaries are
added to show the threat modelling. Figure 3.2 shows the Data Flow Diagram (DFD) depicting
the data flow between a user and the various open government data sources. The trust boundary
shows the border between the trusted and untrusted elements. An attacker, being an untrusted
element can get the details of another user by exploiting the vulnerabilities of open government
sources.
Figure 3.2: Data Flow Diagram (DFD) for various open government databases.
3.3 Data Extraction
The various open government data sources mentioned above do not provide APIs for data access.
The only way to access the data is through the web interface. This requires HTML-parsing and
page-scraping techniques which make the system little prone to errors. The seed information
and the result set for each source was different to be discussed separately.
3.3.1 Driving Licence Number
Since the Driving Licence number exist in sequential order, we could collect a large volume
of data. We took 5 different driving licence numbers belonging to different students at the
university. Each of these five driving licence numbers are then sequentially incremented (upto
300) and queried against the database and the results are stored in locally maintained data bank
for later retrieval and analysis.
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3.3.2 Voter ID Number
The mandatory inputs to Voter ID government portal is the constituency number and name of
the person. As stated earlier, there are 70 constituencies in Delhi region. Current state of the
art gives results of all the individuals starting with a particular alphabet when the input to the
system is a single alphabet, say ‘a’. The result pool is looped for all the 70 constituencies and
stored in the local database.
3.3.3 Permanent Account Number (PAN)
The mandatory inputs to the PAN card income tax portal is the name (last name, first name)
and the DOB. This information was obtained from the Driver’s license database. It was then
used to query the PAN number portal and the results were stored in a separate database for
analysis.
3.3.4 Mahanagar Telephone Nigam Limited (MTNL) Phone Numbers
The only input the MTNL phone directory portal was the name of the person. However, with the
current state of the art, just entering a random character (for e.g., say ‘a’), it gave information
about all the individuals whose name start with ‘a’. The portal is queried for all the 26 English
alphabets. Figure 3.3 below shows the architecture diagram for OCEAN to extract data from
open government data sources.
3.4 Information Aggregation
The final step was to combine the information that was obtained from various sources. The
database described above gave some unique information about the user. The aggregation of
information was important because a user might hide some personal attributes from a particular
social network, but after aggregation we can get comparatively large amount of information.
E.g., the location attribute is not available publicly through Facebook, but when that user is
found to be connected to other networks; his location could be derived from the latter. The
aggregation could be performed on three networks i.e., Twitter, Foursquare and Facebook. This
was possible since some of the foursquare users mentioned Facebook and / or Twitter accounts
on their foursquare profile. PHP scripts were written to get data from the government websites.
The data collected from data sources were stored in the MySQL tables. Since a user can exist
in both the databases, we tried to aggregate such users together. This was done on the basis
of name, address of the user. There is a lack of consistency in the various terminologies and
methodologies employed by different authorities. Therefore, this aggregation was challenging
since the format of address storage differs across the databases and hence decreased the number
of users that could be aggregated. The aggregated results were visualized using a Family tree
which shows information about his / her parents, siblings and spouse.
3.4.1 Social Networks
Public API calls were used to collect information from social networks. The names which exist in
the government databases were used to query the OSNs. Twitter’s REST API v1 and v1.1 were
used to get the data. OAuth tokens were used for authorization and authentication. Facebook
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Figure 3.3: Architecture diagram for obtaining data from open government data sources.
Graph API gave access token for getting the data from Facebook servers. Foursquare API
v2 was used to search the users from foursquare. Calls through Google Plus was made with
authenticated keys unique to the user account. LinkedIn used OAuth tokens to authorize data
collection. The process of data collection was slow and time demanding since API calls that
are used to extract data are rate limited. For e.g., the daily limit for GooglePlus to extract the
user information is 10k requests/day and the number of profiles on GooglePlus is high, the rate
limit exceeded very frequently and hence slowed down the process. Figure 3.4 below shows the
architecture diagram for OCEAN to extract data from various online social networks.
Figure 3.4: Architecture diagram for obtaining data from social networks.
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Chapter 4
System Design
Our work is divided into two parts. In the first part, we did a threat modelling on various
open government data sources to understand the risks and threats arising due to the public
availability of personal information of the residents of Delhi from these repositories. We then
created a system called OCEAN: Open-source Collation of eGovernment data And Networks
which brings together the information from these sources under one roof. The other part was
a user study to measure the accuracy, effectiveness and usability of the system. The study also
focussed on understanding the perceptions, reactions and expectations of the people after using
this system. In this section, we elaborate the results from the first part of our work, i.e. results
obtained after building OCEAN.
OCEAN was made available to the general public on January 21, 2013. Since then, it has
recorded 407 unique visitors (as on October 10, 2013). OCEAN has 8,195,053 Voterrolls; 2,24,982
Driving licences; 53,419 PAN card numbers; 1,557,715 Twitter; 3,377,102 Facebook; 29,393
Foursquare; 1,86,798 LinkedIn and 28,900 GooglePlus records. Figure 4.1 shows the first screen
of the system where the user enters the name and location (location) of the person he wants
to search. The user is also required to enter a CAPTCHA which is implemented as a security
feature for the system. The user is then re-directed to the result page where he can view the
Figure 4.1: Screen 1 of the system where the user is required to enter the name, location (optional) of
the person he wants to search and a CAPTCHA to verify himself as a human.
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results based on his query. The page shows the results for Voter ID, driving licence number, PAN
numbers and the social networks as shown in the Figure 4.1. The page also shows the results
of the users existing across the various open government sources under the ‘Results across the
e-govt db’ tab. The system results for specific open government database can be viewed by
Figure 4.2: Screen 2 of the system where the user is shown the results from the system for his query.
clicking the respective tabs. Figure 4.3 shows the result-set for driving licence number database
of Government of Delhi. Figure 4.4 shows the family tree of the person which is obtained by
Figure 4.3: Results for only the driving licence database based on the user query.
aggregating the information within the Voter ID database. This tree pictorially represents the
details of parents and siblings of the user. OCEAN has 3,03,393 users whose family tree can be
displayed.
Apart from the open government databases, OCEAN also gives the personal information about a
user from social networking sites like Facebook, Twitter, GooglePlus, LinkedIn and Foursquare.
The tab Combined shows the results of the user on aggregation from Foursquare, Facebook and
Twitter. Foursquare allows user to specify their Facebook and Twitter account. For such set of
users, the three databases are combined and displayed. OCEAN has 11 such users. Figure 4.5
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Figure 4.4: Family Tree of the user, created by information aggregation shows the details of parents and
siblings of the user.
shows the results obtained for one such random user whose details are available from Facebook,
Twitter and Foursquare.
Figure 4.5: Combined details of the user from Facebook, Twitter and Foursquare.
OCEAN is scalable in obtaining data from other information sources like criminal records of a
person, electricity bill payment etc. The data can also be collected from other states in India.
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Chapter 5
Experiments and Analysis
In this section, we will focus ourselves to the analysis of the data obtained from the survey
dataset. This section talks about calculating privacy score of the people existing in OCEAN,
accuracy and system usability score of the system. This section also gives an empirical analysis
about the reactions, perceptions and expectations of the people after using the system.
5.1 Survey Dataset
We collected data from an online survey which was distributed to the university’s mailing list
and shared on the social networking sites. People were asked to use the system and fill the
survey study. We have received 62 complete responses. Among the participants, 51% are males
and 49% are females, 77% are in the age of 20 to 25, 60% hold a college degree or higher. 23%
participants had either self or friends experienced with identity thefts online.
5.2 Privacy Score
A privacy score of the user measures the risk associated with the person on the leakage of his
/ her personally identifiable information from the open government databases. The user is at
risk if this information is available freely to everyone since it can be used with malicious intents.
Harel et.al [12] calculated a similar M-score: Estimating the Potential Damage of Data Leakage
Incident by Assigning Misuseability Weight, of the relational databases maintained by the or-
ganizations to handle employee data. It estimates the damage which can result if organization’s
data is exposed and falls into wrong hands.
Sensitivity score function: The sensitivity score function f: C * Sj → [0,1] assigns a sensi-
tivity score to each possible value x of Sj , according to the specific context c  C in which the
table was exposed. The sensitivity score is defined by the user as it reflects the data owner’s
perception of the data’s importance in different contexts. People will consider the information
as private / public in different contexts. For e.g., giving the bank account balance when talking
with mortgage consultant against a stranger on the street. For each record r, xr of Sj as Sj [xr].
RRSi: Raw Record Score for record i, calculated from the summation of the sensitivity score of
all the attributes in that record and
Di: Distinguishability factor which determines the uniqueness of the record.
x: Settable parameter for adjusting the effect of the table size on the final score.
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Input: A set of ‘r’ records for users in the organization.
Result: M-score of the user.
initialization;
Assign sensitivity score to each record.
for each record i in R do
RRSi = min(1,
∑
SjT
f(c, Sj [xi])) (5.1)
Mscore = r1/x ∗RS = r1/x ∗ max
0≤i≤r
(
RRSi
Di
) (5.2)
if (Sensitivity of data insignificant) then
x = 1;
else
x = ∞;
end
end
Algorithm 1: Algorithm for calculating M-score.
We now show how we can sue this equation in our case of open government databases:
5.2.1 Number of records, ‘r’ in all the open government databases
The number of records / users, ‘r’ specific to certain open government databases with the
corresponding attributes is shown in the Table 5.1. For e.g., driving licence contains the user
whose entry is present only in the driving licence database, not in Voter ID and pancard.
Table 5.1: Number and attributes for each open government database.
Database Number of
Records
Attributes
Driving licence 1,65,121 DL number, Name, Address, Relative’s name, DOB.
Voter ID 81,88,669 Voter ID, Name, Address, Father’s / Mother’s / Husband’s
name, Age, Gender.
PAN card 53,419 PAN Number, Name, DL number, Address, Relative’s
name, DOB.
Voter ID + driving
licence
6,384 Voter ID, DL number, Name, Address, Father’s / Mother’s
/ Husband’s name, Age, Gender.
Voter ID + driv-
ing licence + PAN
number
1,693 Voter ID, DL number, PAN number, Name, Address, Fa-
ther’s / Mother’s / Husband’s name, Age, Gender.
5.2.2 Sensitivity Score
The sensitivity score relies on the perceptions and attitude of the people as calculated from our
survey study. One of the goals of the survey was to collect user’s information-sharing preferences.
Given a list of prole items that span a large spectrum of ones personal life (e.g., Name, Gender,
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DOB, Address, Voter ID, driving licence number, PAN number, Age, Father’s name), the users
were asked to specify whether they want to share this information online. Since in our case,
the government databases are visible to everyone, we only consider the case where the user
does not want to put his / her information online / not share with everyone. According to the
proportion of users marking it non-sharable, a privacy level is allocated values {1,2,3,4,5} to
each attribute where level ‘1’ means people are not very restrictive in sharing their information
with everyone and ‘5’ meaning people do not want to share their information with anybody.
Thus, the sensitivity score for each attribute is directly mapped with the privacy level for each
attribute. Higher the privacy level, more sensitive is the information. Table 5.2 below shows
the response of the users from the survey for the attributes relevant in our case.
Table 5.2: Response of the survey users showing their unwillingness to share their personal information
with everybody.
Attribute Percentage of users
unwilling to share
with anybody
Privacy level
Voter ID 56.4% 4
Driving licence
number
58% 4
PAN 67.7% 5
Full name 14.5% 1
Home Address 82.2% 5
Age 29% 2
DOB 50% 3
Father’s name 38.7% 3
Gender 14.5% 1
5.2.3 Distinguishability Factor and ‘x’
For our scenario, we take the value of x = ∞ since the sensitiveness of the information is the
key for our evaluation. Also, the distinguishability factor, Di of our attribute set is 1 since every
user has a unique key to uniquely identify itself (Voter ID, driving licence number, PAN number).
Our equation is thus reduced to
PrivacyScore = r0 ∗ max
0≤i≤r
(
RRSi
1
) (5.3)
or
PrivacyScore = max
0≤i≤r
RRSi (5.4)
where
RRSi =
∑
SjT
Sj [xi] (5.5)
Using this equation, the Privacy Score (PS) for all the users in each of the open government
databases can be calculated as:
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• Case 1: Users having only Voter ID (97.3%)
PS =
∑
(Voter ID, name, father’s name, age, gender, address) = 16
• Case 2: Users having only driving licence number (2%)
PS =
∑
(DL number, name, relative’s name, DOB, address) = 17
• Case 3: Users having only PAN number (1%)
PS =
∑
(PAN number, DL number, name, relative’s name, DOB, address) = 25
• Case 4: Users having Voter ID and DL number (0.07%)
PS =
∑
(Voter ID, DL number, name, father’s name, age, gender, DOB, address) = 24
• Case 5: Users having Voter ID, DL number and PAN number (0.02%)
PS =
∑
(Voter ID, DL number, PAN number, name, father’s name, age, gender, DOB , address)
= 29
The person with higher privacy score is at greater risk since more number of personal attributes
are available to uniquely identify him / her online. 1,693 people, whose privacy score is 29 are
at maximum risk and most vulnerable to attacks. We have multiple personal attributes which
can uniquely identify that person like Voter ID, Driving license number, PAN number, home
address. It then becomes easy to perform targeted personal attacks against these people. For
e.g., getting fake Voter ID cards, fake bank accounts, multiple SIM cards issued in their name
etc. As discussed in chapter 1, is also possible to register them on some vulnerable sites (for
e.g., Income tax payment portal) and view highly sensitive information like the TDS statement.
5.3 Evaluation Metrics
5.3.1 Recall and System Usability Score
The system recall is defined as
Recall =
Number of people who could be identified in the system
Total number of search operations done on the system
(5.6)
Thus, Recall = (179 / 389) * 100 = 46%.
The recall is low since web collection does not give 100% results. We have around 8 million
of the total 12 million Voter ID records 1. As part of our future work, we plan to expand our
database.
The System Usability score (SUS) is measured using the standard method by Brooke et.al. [15]
For OCEAN, the values of SUS comes out to be 74.5 / 100 which means that people found the
system usable and convenient to use.
5.4 User Experience and Expectations
In this section, we talk about the privacy awareness of the citizens about the open government
data, their reactions to the availability of this information after using OCEAN and expectations
from the government departments handling the public databases in how to protect this infor-
mation.
1http://m.indianexpress.com/news/electoral-roll-complete-delhi-has-1.23-cr-voters/1057665/
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Ironically, even though the government has started various open government initiatives to in-
crease the level of transparency with it’s citizens in terms of their data, majority of the people
are still unaware of these services. According to our survey results, only 19% people are aware
of the existing online public databases like Voter ID, PAN number, Electricity bill payment,
Income tax payment and driving licence portals. Around 76% have only started using these
services for less than 2 years. This shows that although the government has given access to
the data in digital form for easy delivery of government services to it’s citizens, it is not being
properly conveyed to the general public. Hence, the government needs to come up with proper
scheme and plans to convey the existence and utility of these systems to the public effectively.
However, once the citizens are aware of the existence of these open government databases after
using OCEAN, they are not really comfortable with their personal information put online. The
reactions of users are captured in Figure 5.1 and Figure 5.2. According to our study, 62% of the
respondents were shocked to see that such large amount of personal information is accessible
to everyone and said that they now feel reluctant in sharing their information with the various
government departments. When the participants were asked (Question: “The availability of this
personal information does not bother me as it does not harm me personally”), 57% were against
this statement and felt that this information could be used maliciously against them. Some of
the feedback for the system, which shows the sentiment of the users are, ‘The system’s implica-
tions and functionality are undoubtedly great. I am really shocked that the exact ID numbers are
available online without much security against data mining at this scale.’, ‘It was an eye-opener
to a common man and arouse the curiosity to disclose personal details very cautiously.’.
Figure 5.1: Screenshot showing how shocked users were after using OCEAN.
Figure 5.2: Screenshot showing how much users were scared after using OCEAN.
Given that the people are now aware of the large amount of information available online by sev-
eral government departments, we now discuss the expectations of people from these government
authorities. 43% people thought that there is no need to put the personal information about
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the individuals online. However, 52% felt that the information could be available online but
with proper rules and regulations so that the accessibility of the information to everybody could
be restricted. When asked about what personal information should not be put online, around
65% of the participants felt that uniquely identifiable information like Voter ID, driving licence
number, PAN number, home address, MTNL phone number should not be made available. 8 -
9% people said that details like name, age, gender should not be put online while 15% people felt
uncomfortable sharing their DOB and father’s name to everyone online. In response to the ex-
pectations of the people from the government on the availability of such large amount of personal
information online, 43% people felt that authorization mechanisms (username, password) should
be implemented for accessing the data. This helps in a way that it will allow a user to view
only his / her details rather having access to everyone’s information. 21% of the participants
were in favour of having security measures like CAPTCHA which prevents data collection on
the government websites which give access to these databases. Searching for a large set of users
manually is little cumbersome than writing scripts to extract all the data at once. Solutions like
CAPTCHA restrict the implementation of these scripts to some extent. This could be a first
step in protecting the information by government of Delhi on it’s public servers. 34% people
felt that proper privacy laws should be created so that even though the government needs to
put this information for streamlining its own information gathering and processing procedures,
legal liabilities must exist against the hackers and malicious users. It is interesting to see that
only 2% of the participants felt that the data should be removed immediately. This shows that
people want easy access to their information provided that proper security measures and privacy
laws are made to govern the accessibility of such personal information.
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Chapter 6
Conclusion, Limitation and Future
Work
In this chapter, we will cover the conclusion of our work, discuss the limitations and scope of
improvement as the future work.
6.1 Conclusion
On developing OCEAN:Open-source Collation of eGovernment data And Networks, we demon-
strated that large amount of authentic data is available on government servers like Voter ID,
driving licence number, PAN number. Querying this database with little seed data gives a lot
of personal data about the target. The ease with which this data can be extracted calls for
addition of security features to be put on such sensitive data. The fact that the source of data
is issuing authority (Government of India departments) itself makes it even more valuable as it
comes with guarantee of being mostly accurate.
Given the range and volume of data that we were able to collect during the course of our the-
sis work, it is easy to conclude the increasing privacy threats to any individual covered in the
databases mentioned. In fact, in some cases the query parameters can be sequentially generated,
making it easier to gather data in bulk. With the interlinking (output data from one source
as input to the other) of data-sources, we can achieve the horizontal-depth for every subject in
the database. It is for this reason that, identification of any new such sources adds both the
horizontal and vertical (volume) of the collected data. The PII collected apart from being a
serious privacy violation, can be used to draft personalize attacks against individual including
impersonation (Many scenarios use some of this information like mothers maiden name, PAN
as additional information to confirm an individuals identity).
A threat modelling on these open government databases and a DREAD score of ‘13’ shows the
level of risk from these data sources and ascertains that the government needs to ensure that
the data available on its servers is not used by people with malicious intent.
An privacy score in the range 16 - 29 for the people existing in OCEAN suggests that the Delhi
residents are at risk and their privacy is at stake due to the availability of their PII online. The
recall of the OCEAN was found to be 46% and SUS score of 74.5 which shows that the users of
OCEAN found it usable and convenient to use.
A survey study of 62 users showed that people were shocked to see that such large amount of
information exists on the government databases. It also showed that people feel that this infor-
mation could be used maliciously against them. Majority of the people felt that the government
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should implement authorization mechanisms like username and password on the websites re-
vealing this information to restrict the information availability to anyone and everyone.
6.2 Limitation
Datasets available are limited to the residents of Delhi. Since the data is collected from the
government websites, the dataset is not 100% and hence the recall is less. For creating the
family tree, the record for the person and his father are matched, spelling mistakes of the same
person in multiple government database sources put a constraint in aggregation. We have limited
users across multiple government databases. Since the address format for Voter ID and driving
licence was different, it was difficult to map the users across both the databases.
6.3 Future Work
As a part of future work, the database can be expanded which was limited since complete data
could not be collected from the government websites. This will help to improve the recall of
the system. One can also incorporate national level databases i.e., databases existing in other
states of India into OCEAN and show the privacy leakage, if any, for that state. One can also
look into the UID Aadhar card database to see if any privacy breach exist and general public
can get access to the complete database.
Instead of broadly looking at all the Delhi citizens, one can specifically focus on a single user
by collecting his information from all possible sources on the web. It can be used to calculate a
reputation score for the person in the society. For e.g., collecting information from the criminal
records of a state can be used to calculate such score. If a person is found in that record, it
will assign a negative score to the person whereas a person who cannot be found in any of such
records will get a better reputation score in the society. An aggregation of all this information
can help compare a person‘s image in the society.
One can also aggregate results from social media to find attributes about an entity and hence map
that user with the data obtained from open government data sources. This helps in connecting
an offline identity (as in govt. sources) with an online identity (as maintained on online social
networks) of a user. Since the public attributes available from the social media are limited, one
needs to adopt a proper methodology to extract maximum amount of information from these
social networking sites.
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